The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules (WSR's) on three candidates for large electorates when voter indifference between candidates is allowed. It is shown that increasing the proportion of voters who have partial indifference will increase the probability that a Condorcet winner exists, and will also increase the Condorcet efficiency of all WSR's. The same observation is observed when the proportion of voters with complete preferences on candidates is reduced. Borda Rule is shown to be the WSR with maximum Condorcet efficiency over a broad range of assumptions related to voter preferences. The result of forcing voters to completely rank all candidates, by randomly breaking ties on candidates that are viewed as indifferent, leads to a reduction in the probability that a Condorcet winner exists and to a reduction in the Condorcet efficiency of all WSR's.
Introduction
When two candidates are being considered in an election, it is difficult to argue against the basic notion that majority rule should be implemented to determine the winner. However, many different criteria have been established to determine who the winner should be when more than two candidates are being considered. One criterion that has received a great deal of attention is attributed to Condorcet (1785). For a three candidate election, the Condorcet winner would be the candidate who would be able to defeat each of the other two candidates by majority rule in pairwise elections. It is well known that a Condorcet winner does not always exist, but the Condorcet winner would seem to be a good candidate for selection when one does exist. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the conditional probability that it elects the Condorcet winner, given that one exists. An extensive survey of research on the probability that a Condorcet winner exists and the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules is given in Gehrlein (1997) .
Most of the research to date on the probability that there is a Condorcet winner and on Condorcet efficiency has focused on the situation in which all voters have complete preference rankings on the candidates, with no indifference allowed.
Exceptions to this have dealt with the probability that there is a Condorcet winner when indifference is allowed [Van Deemen (1999) , Lepelley and Martin (1998) , Fishburn and Gehrlein (1980) , Jones, Radcliff, Taber and Timpone (1995) ]. The purpose of the current study is to consider the impact that voter indifference on candidates will have on the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules. Attention is restricted to the case of three candidate elections in the limiting case of a large electorate. The probability that voters will have given preferences on candidates is assumed to follow an extension of the widely used impartial culture condition.
Impartial Culture with Indifference
Consider three candidates [A,B,C] in an election. Let B A f denote the situation in which a voter prefers candidate A to candidate B. Then, A~B denotes the situation of voter indifference between candidate A and candidate B. There are six possible complete preference rankings on the candidates that might represent the preferences of a voter when indifference between candidates is not allowed:
where p i is the probability that a randomly selected voter has the associated preference ranking on candidates. The condition of impartial culture (IC) is a commonly used assumption for studies that do not allow indifference between candidates in voter preference structures. With IC, it is assumed that p i = 1/6 for each preference ranking with 1 < i < 6, and that all voters arrive at their preferences independently.
We wish to extend the notion of IC, to apply it to the case that allows for indifference between candidates in the preferences of voters. In general, we shall only require that voter preference structures be represented by weak orders. We let the voters with complete preference rankings, like those above, represent a class of voters. A second class of voters will have weak ordered preferences with partial indifference. An example of partial indifference would be a voter who has A~B but feels that both C A f and that C B f . There are six different weak ordered preference structures that represent partial indifference: The third class of voters will have preferences that represent complete indifference, with A~B, A~C and B~C. Let p 13 denote the probability that a voter has preferences represented by complete indifference.
Let k 1 denote the probability that a randomly selected voter is among the class of voters with complete preference rankings. Similarly, k 2 denotes the probability for voters with partial indifference, and k 3 denotes the probability for voters with complete indifference on candidates. We then have k 1 + k 2 + k 3 = 1. The impartial weak order culture condition (IWOC) then assumes that all preference structures within a class of voter preference types are equally likely to be observed. With the voter preferences that we defined above: p i = k 1 /6 for i=1,2,3,4,5,6; p i = k 2 /6 for i=7,8,9,10,11,12; and k 3 = p 13 .
Let the vector k = (k 1 ,k 2 ,k 3 ). Fishburn and Gehrlein (1980) Some interesting results that will be used later follow directly from the stated representation for ) IWOC ( P Con ∞ . These results were first suggested by Inada (1964) . 
Proof:
The proof is obtained directly by differentiating ) IWOC ( P Con ∞ with respect to k 1 .
QED
As a result of these lemmas, we observe two major trends. First, as voters' preferences shift from complete indifference to partial indifference, there is an increase in the probability that a Condorcet winner exists. The second observation is somewhat more surprising, in that we see a decrease in the probability that there is a Condorcet winner as voters' preferences shift from complete indifference to complete preference rankings. A simple extension is that there is a decrease in the probability that there is a Condorcet winner as voters' preferences shift from partial indifference to complete preference rankings.
Having considered the probability that a Condorcet winner exists with IWOC and the results that were observed, we turn our attention to the probability that various common election procedures select the Condorcet winner when there is one. It will be of particular interest to determine the effect that the existence of partial indifference will have on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules.
Condorcet Efficiency with IWOC
The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule has been defined as the conditional probability that the particular voting rule elects the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. We consider the family of voting rules that can be represented by weighted scoring rules. A weighted scoring rule (WSR) for three candidates assigns weights of 1, λ , and 0 points respectively to each voter's first, second, and third ranked candidate according to their preferences on the candidates. The winner is then selected as the candidate who receives the most total points over all voters. The specific case with λ =0 represents the commonly used plurality rule, and the case of λ =1 is negative plurality rule.
A WSR can be applied directly to voters with complete preference rankings, but some modification must be made when indifference exists. To assure that all voters have the same overall input to the election, we require that each voter has a total of 1+ λ points to distribute to candidates. Suppose that a voter has preferences with partial indifference such that C. B and
For any complete ranking that includes these preferences, A would always be ranked first, so we will give A a weight of one with the WSR. Candidates B and C would receive either λ or 0 points in a complete ranking that includes these preferences, so we will give both B and C an average weight of λ /2 with the WSR. Using the same basic notion, with voters having partial indifference of the
; we assign zero points to A and (1+ λ )/2 points to each of B and C. For voters with complete indifference, each candidate will be given (1+ λ )/3 points by the WSR.
To find the Condorcet efficiency of WSR with weight λ , which we denote as Rule λ , we need a representation for the joint probability, J( λ ,k,IWOC), that some candidate, say candidate A, is both the Condorcet winner and is elected by Rule λ under IWOC. To develop a representation for J( λ ,k,IWOC), we begin by defining four discrete variables, which have values that are determined by the p i probabilities that are associated with voter preference structures:
X 1 = 1: p 1 +p 2 +p 4 +p 8 +p 10 X 2 = 1: p 1 +p 2 +p 3 +p 7 +p 10 -1: p 3 +p 5 +p 6 +p 9 +p 11 -1: p 4 +p 5 +p 6 +p 9 +p 12
-(1+ λ )/2 : p 9 (2-λ )/2 : p 10 (2-λ )/2 : p 10 ( λ -2)/2 : p 11 ( λ -2)/2 : p 12
With these definitions of the X i 's, we note that A will be ranked over (under) B in a voter's preference structure when X 1 = +1 (-1). Similarly, A will be ranked over (under) C in a voter's preference structure when X 2 = +1(-1). The value of X 3 (X 4 )
represents the difference in weights that Rule λ assigns to candidates A and B (C). If we have a total of n voters and let i X denote the average value of X i over the n voters, it follows from the definitions that J( λ ,k,IWOC) is equivalent to the joint probability that i X >0 for i=1,2,3,4. We are assuming that each voter's preferences are independent of other voters' preferences.
Some observations are made about the distribution of the X i 's that will be useful later. First, we note that the definitions of the p i 's under IWOC lead to the fact that E(X i )=0 for i=1,2,3,4 where E(X i ) denotes the expected value of X i . The variance, V(X i ), of X i is then given as ) X ( E 2 i . With the definitions of the X i 's and IWOC we obtain 
We return to our definition of J( λ ,k,IWOC) as the joint probability that 0 Xi > for i=1,2,3,4. It follows directly for n voters, that J( λ ,k,IWOC) is equivalent to the joint probability that 0 n Xi > for i=1,2,3,4. In the limit that ∞ → n , the probability that any i X takes on any specific value, such as zero goes to zero. Thus, J( λ ,k) is equivalent to the joint probability that 0 n Xi ≥ for i=1,2,3,4. As a final step, we use the fact that ( ) 0 X E i = to observe that J( λ ,k,IWOC) is equivalent to the joint probability that Theorem 1. J( λ ,k,IWOC) increases as k 2 increases, and it decreases as k 1 increases.
Proof: A result due to Slepian (1962) can be applied directly in this case to prove the first part of the statement. In particular, if some elements of R will increase, and none will decrease as k 2 increases, ) R ( 4 Φ will increase. From our definitions, it is sufficient to show that both ρ and b increase as k 2 increases. After taking derivatives, we find ( ) and Lemma 1 respectively. Thus, it is not immediately obvious as to the effect that changing k 2 has on their ratio. Similarly, both J( λ ,k,IWOC) and ) IWOC ( P Con ∞ are decreasing as k 1 increases, so it is not obvious as to the effect that changing k 1 has on their ratio.
Some interesting results do follow from the representation for CE( λ ,k,IWOC)
for Rule λ , with λ = ½, which is a special case that is known as Borda Rule.
, and CE( λ ,k,IWOC) increases as λ increases from 0 to ½ , with CE( λ ,k,IWOC) being maximized at λ = ½.
is not a function of λ , the statement will be proved as long as it can be shown to be true for ) R ( 
QED

Based on this result, we see that Borda Rule is the WSR that maximizes
Condorcet efficiency for three candidates under IWOC in the limit of voters for all k. Gehrlein and Fishburn (1978) proved this result for the original case of IC, with k 1 =1.
Van Newenhizen (1992) presents a similar result for a more general assumption regarding voter preference profiles when indifference is not allowed. Saari (1990) 
Let k* define any k with k 1 = 0 and k 2 > 0. Given the discussion above, it follows that the Condorcet efficiency of Rule λ in the limit of voters with three candidates is given by We begin by finding a much more tractable representation for CE( λ ,k,IWOC) than the one given above. In particular, we find a representation for ) R ( 
This representation for ) R ( conjecture is verified numerically, it seems quite unlikely that it is not generally true.
Conjecture 1. CE( λ ,k,IWOC) increases as k 2 increases, and it decreases as k 1 increases.
Thus, we reach the same conclusions for the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules as we did for the probability that a Condorcet winner exists under IWOC. That is, the existence of increased partial indifference will increase Condorcet efficiency, while the existence of an increased number of complete preference rankings will decrease Condorcet efficiency. As a result of Conjecture 1, IC (or any other situation with k 2 =0
and k 1 >0) represents a worst case scenario for the evaluation of WSR's over the range of IWOC conditions. Theorem 3. CE( λ ,k,IWOC) under forced ranking is identical to CE( λ ,k,IC).
The Effect of Forcing Preference Rankings
Proof. With forced ranking under IWOC, the X i 's that are used in the development of correlation matrix R are based upon the six possible complete preference rankings. The probability that is associated with each ranking is then obtained from an accumulation over the different situations from which each complete ranking might be obtained.
Arbitrarily consider the complete ranking C B A f f that was obtained by the forced ranking scenario. The first possibility, is that the voter had that particular complete preference ranking, which happens with probability p 1 = k 1 /6. A second possibility is 
